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Abstract—This paper reports a practical quantum-safe metro 
network, integrating optically-switched QKD systems with high 
speed reconfigurablility to protect classical network traffic. 
Quantum signals are routed by millisecond optical switches and 
secure keys are shared between any two endpoints or network 
nodes via low-latency reconfigurable connections. Efficient 
quantum encryption topologies between different end-users are 
also presented. We show experimentally the feasibility of a 
rapidly reconfigured QKD transmission system between multiple 
users in the proposed network. Classical data and control signals 
coexist with the quantum signals in the same fibre.  Proof-of-
concept experiments are conducted over effective transmission 
distances of 30km, 31.7km, 33.1km and 44.6km. Software 
controlled QKD transmission is established between four 
different transmitters (Alice) and one receiver (Bob) with a 
switching time of a few milliseconds.  The quantum bit error 
rates (QBER) for the four paths are proportional to the channel 
losses with values between 2.6% and 4.1%.  Optimization of the 
reconciliation and clock distribution architecture is predicted to 
result in a maximum key generation delay of 20s, far shorter than 
previously demonstrated. 
 
Index Terms— Metropolitan area networks, Optical switches, 




NCRYPTED data transmission is becoming more 
important as information security is vital in modern 
communication networks. In conventional encryption systems, 
the security relies on assumptions about the limits on the 
computational capability of the eavesdropper in revealing the 
key [1-3]. Whilst this is currently a reasonable assumption, the 
advent of sufficiently powerful quantum computers may 
render certain conventional keys insecure [4]. Alternatively, 
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is becoming a promising 
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method for generating and distributing unconditionally secure 
keys for use in classical data encryption, such as the AES [5]. 
Here QKD is able to ensure secure key transmission by virtue 
of quantum mechanics [6]. Since the QKD protocol BB84 was 
proposed in 1984 [7], and the first experimental demonstration 
of a QKD system in 1992 [8], QKD has been widely 
demonstrated over standard single mode fiber and significant 
progress has been achieved in the performance of point-to-
point QKD links. In recent years, the transmission distance has 
been extended to over hundreds of kilometers of optical fibre 
[9] and the secure bit rate achievable has reached megabits per 
second [10], making QKD applicable in both metro and access 
telecommunication networks.  
In order to realize quantum encrypted data transmission in 
metro networks, quantum keys need to be distributed and 
shared between multiple end users. A multi-user QKD 
experiment was first demonstrated by Townsend et al. in 1996 
[11][12], using a passive optical splitter to realize point-to-
multipoint quantum key transmission. Optical splitters were 
then implemented in passive QKD networks by many research 
groups [13-16]. Although QKD networks based on this 
technology have low network complexity and low cost, they 
all share two major weaknesses: the connections cannot be 
selected on demand and the number of users is limited owing 
to the loss from passive splitters. However, optical switching 
has been shown as an alternative technique for cost-effective 
QKD networking, enabling dynamic reconfiguration of 
transmission paths with low insertion loss. The earliest 
optically switched QKD system was demonstrated by Toliver 
et al. [17], in which a secure key was established between 
Alice and Bob through different types of optical switching 
elements, such as microelectromechanical (MEMS), lithium 
niobate (LiNbO3), and optomechanical switches [18][19]. 
Optical switching has since been extensively employed in 
many QKD network field trials [20-23]. However, these 
techniques cannot be used to extend the QKD transmission 
distance. Such a problem is normally solved by the application 
of trusted nodes in point-to-point links. Trusted nodes, whilst 
less cost-effective and flexible, have been shown as a simple 
and reliable technique to establish QKD networks from fixed 
point-to-point links [24][25]. Most recently, a hybrid metro 
QKD network with five nodes has been successfully 
demonstrated by Pan et al [26], using both optical switching 
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and trusted repeater devices. By deploying this kind of hybrid 
network, QKD connections can be reconfigured between 
different users and scaled. Indeed, previous works also suggest 
the practical deployment of switched QKD in current metro 
networks [27][28]. 
However, the latency (defined as time required to produce 
secure key material) reported in the above switched systems 
and networks ranges from 40s to even as long as 20mins, 
being limited by the speed of the optical switch itself, the need 
for realignment of the system, and the protocol-dependent key 
regeneration time. This latency significantly limits network 
reconfigurability and reduces the overall quantum key 
transmission speed between users. In this work, we address an 
effective quantum-safe network solution which integrates 
reduced latency reconfigurable QKD in a realistic metro 
network. This solution has the potential for rapidly switching 
the quantum channel between multiple users and the resuming 
secure key transmission immediately between different Alices 
and Bobs. The proposed network architecture, as well as the 
operational principle of both dynamic key sharing and data 
encryption, are described in Section II. Experimentally, by a 
series of proof-of-concept experiments, we show the 
feasibility of a rapidly switched automated multi-node QKD 
system within this architecture. Section III illustrates the setup 
including a centralized QKD server (Bob) that exchanges 
quantum keys with multiple QKD clients (Alices) in either 
time-division multiplexing (TDM) or Handshake modes. 
Section IV presents the principle of the Coherent One-Way 
(COW) protocol which is used by this QKD system. 
Experimental results are shown and discussed in Section V.  A 
brief conclusion of this paper with proposed future work is 
recorded in Section VI.   
II. QUANTUM-SAFE METRO NETWORK 
A conventional metropolitan-scale network architecture 
may be considered in two parts; the Access network and the 
Metro network. The Metro network interconnects a number of 
Metro nodes to span different physical metro areas and 
provide high capacity paths between them. Metro Routers 
normally use carrier grade routing equipment which enables 
transmission at capacities of up to 100Gbit/s. At the periphery, 
Edge Routers with relatively lower traffic capacity transfer 
data between the Metro network and local access networks 
using Gigabit Ethernet. An optical access network normally 
uses passive optical networking (PON). The data packet 
includes the header, which gives information of the source and 
destination address, in addition to the transmitted information. 
Both Edge and Metro Routers are able to retrieve the IP 
address (the header) of the data packets from end users and 
route them to their desired destinations. By comparison, Edge 
Routers receive (send) customer data packets from (to) the 
Metro network while Metro Routers forward the data packets 
between other Metro/Edge Routers.  
The system proposed in this paper integrates QKD into 
existing metro networks as shown in Fig. 1. Within the Metro 
network, a QKD system is installed (including an Alice-Bob 
pair and a QKD server) at the physical location of each Metro 
Router within a Metro Node (e.g. Metro Node A in Fig. 1).  
The Alice and Bob sub-systems are connected via a low loss 
optical switch, which enables the reconfiguration of quantum 
signal routes between different nodes. Alice and Bob are all 
electronically connected and controlled by a QKD server via 
 
Fig. 1.  The proposed quantum safe metro network architecture  




an Ethernet switch. Through a switch, the QKD server 
provides the quantum keys to external encryption devices (i.e. 
Line cards) and communicates with its relevant Alice-Bob 
pairs. The line cards, installed at each port of a Metro Router, 
are then used for the point-to-point encryption which will be 
explained in detail later. Separately, each end user in an access 
network has a QKD Alice device (as this is usually less 
expensive than a Bob device). Between the Metro Node and 
the end users, there are two options for integrating QKD 
depending on the distance between the Edge Router and its 
adjacent Metro Router. Firstly, as illustrated as the Edge Node 
scenario 1 in Fig. 1, if an Edge Router is far from its Metro 
Router, an Edge Router is integrated with a QKD Bob device. 
A low loss optical switch is also employed within such an 
Edge Node to switch the Bob device to different Alices, in the 
access or Metro Nodes. Secondly, if the Edge Router is at the 
same physical location as a Metro router, the Edge Node 
would include both an Edge Router and a Metro Router. This 
node structure is shown as the Edge Node (scenario 2) in 
Fig. 1, which is a combination of the Edge Node (scenario 1) 
and Metro Node A. Thus, this approach removes the need for 
a line card between the Edge Router and Metro Router and the 
need for an extra Bob device. Similarly, Alice can send 
quantum signals to different Metro Nodes, while Bob can 
detect quantum signals from different end users, or Metro 
Nodes, via rapid optical switches.  To ensure synchronisation, 
a clock signal is broadcast from one common source to every 
network node and end user. The clock signal can be realized 
by a master clock, which can use duplicated optical sources 
for failover protection. The quantum, classical and clock 
signals are all wavelength-multiplexed together and 
transmitted in the same optical fibre. Optical-Electrical-
Optical conversion (OEO) of the classical signal is conducted 
at the ports of each router.  
To encrypt the data within such a network, the secure keys 
must first be properly generated and distributed. The QKD 
distribution channels are therefore shown as green lines in 
Fig. 1. The routing of the quantum signals is transparently 
reconfigurable due to optical switching, and quantum keys can 
be dynamically established between any two QKD end points 
(ie. Alice/Bob) within the maximum achievable transmission 
distance of the QKD system. For exchanging keys between 
two distant QKD Alice/Bob combinations, the node can also 
operate as a trusted node (repeater). In this case, the 
mechanism of key sharing is shown in Fig. 2.  Endpoint 1 and 
Endpoint 2/Node 2 firstly establish secure keys K1 and K2 
with the middle trusted node respectively. As the trusted node 
knows both K1 and K2, it will then send K1⊕K2 to Endpoint 
2/Node 2, using the classical channel.  Endpoint 2/Node 2 thus 
knows K1 by applying K1⊕K2⊕K2 = K1 (where ⊕ is an 
exclusive OR operation). 
In both these networking approaches, the QKD signals are 
routed along the same fibers as the classical channels, and the 
QKD servers control the connected Alice-Bob pair. They are 
therefore important in determining the reconfigurability of the 
system as this depends greatly on the time to establish a key 
between a new Alice-Bob pair when the route is switched. The 
overall latency has three components: The first corresponds to 
the delay between issuing the routing signal and the arrival of 
photons at detectors. The second component comprises the 
realignment of the timing and frame information between 
Alice and Bob. This can be reduced by broadcasting a clock 
signal to all endpoints from a single source, and the timing and 
frame information being stored after the first connection and 
later recalled for subsequent connections. The third 
component is the time taken for the specific protocol to begin 
secure key generation between Alice and Bob, which can be 
reduced by the optimization of the protocol implementation. 
Our encryption is based on two different topologies in two 
corresponding steps: “point-to-point” (PTP) encryption 
between the adjacent nodes (ie. Layer 1 encryption) and “end 
to end” (ETE) encryption between distant end users (ie. Layer 
3 encryption). First, ETE encryption, between source and 
destination end users, uses quantum secure keys shared 
between them. At this step, only the payload (data section) of 
data packets are encrypted and the header is left unencrypted, 
as the router in the edge node needs to concern about the 
destination address when transferring the encrypted data. 
Secondly, the layer 1 data encryption between network routers 
is using PTP encryption realized by the line cards. 
Specifically, line cards encrypt/decrypted the full length of the 
passing data packets (both header and data section), which is 
payload-encrypted data packets in the first step, using the 
quantum secure keys shared point to point between network 
nodes. 
III. SIMULATIONS AND PROOF-OF-CONCEPT EXPERIMENTS   
The feasibility of the dynamic reconfiguration of QKD 
routing and secure key establishment between the multiple 
metro nodes has been studied experimentally. This has used a 
commercial ID Quantique (IDQ) QKD device (Clavis 3), 
which is based on a coherent-one-way, or COW, protocol 
[29]. The principle of operation is shown in Fig. 3. In the 
sender Alice, coherent laser pulses at 1.25GHz are generated 
by modulating a continuous-wave laser beam from a random 
number generator. The pulses are subsequently attenuated to 
single-photon level by an optical attenuator.  Each qubit state 
is encoded in two-pulse sequences consisting of a vacuum and 
a non-vacuum pulse (pulse position modulation). To improve 
 
Fig. 2.  Mechanism of exchange secure key between two distant QKD hops 
 
Fig. 3. Illustration of COW protocol principle. AM: amplitude modulator; 
ATT: optical attenuator; RNG: Random number generator. 




the security, decoy states, consisting of two successive laser 
pulses with the same energy levels, are added into the 
sequence. The phase relation between any two successive laser 
pulses must be kept identical. The optical pulses travel down 
the optical fibre to the receiver Bob, which has two detectors. 
Detector D1 is used to measure the arrival time of the laser 
pulses and then generate keys. Detector D2, together with an 
imbalanced interference, monitors eavesdropping by checking 
the phase coherence between consecutive laser pulses. Each 
Alice or Bob, implemented using IDQ Clavis equipment, is 
electrically controlled by a QKD server using an Ethernet link. 
The IDQ software installed in the QKD server performs 
automatic initialization, including frame and time-slot 
alignments, for the connected Alice-Bob pair before the 
generation of secure keys. The user interface continuously 
updates the QBER and the secure key rate. In addition, the 
QKD server stores quantum keys and sends them to 
encryption device.  
The QBER is measured by comparing the bits received by  
Bob and sent by Alice. The secure keys can be then distilled 
from the shared bits between Alice and Bob, which can be 
estimated as following [30],                   
authestsift fRR   secsec  
(1) 
where Rsift is the sifted key rate (ie. the shared key rate after 
QKD sifting process). βest and βauth denotes the key length 
reductions due to parameter estimation and authentication, 
respectively.  fsec is defined to be the secure key fraction under 
the assumption of collective attacks, which is expressed as 
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where Q is QBER whilst βsmooth , βEC and βPA are the key size 
reduction due to the min-entropy smoothing, error correction 
and privacy amplification, respectively. H(x) is the binary 
entropy function and Δ is the overlap between two states, 
given by: 
)1(12)12( 2 VVeeV     (3) 
where V is the visibility and µ is the mean photon-number of 
the emitting laser pulses. 
Fig. 4 shows the proof-of-concept experimental setup and 
the equivalent system schematic. The IDQ Bob device in 
Node A dynamically shares the key with IDQ Alices in the 
four different Nodes via an optical switch. This switch is a 1x4 
port optical switch (Lightwave, 1X4 / 4X1 Latching Optical 
Switch Module), and introduces approximately 2dB optical 
loss into the transmission link. The QKD signal from Alice 
has a pulse width of 500ps and an average power of 0.05 
photon per pulse. The quantum signal uses a wavelength of 
 
Fig. 4. a) Equivalent system schematic. b) Experimental setup. EDFA: Erbium-doped Fiber Amplifier. BERT: Bit Error Rate Test 
Fig. 5. Measured system switching time (red arrow). The blue line shows the 
Routing signal from DIO card. The green line is the output pulses from a 
single photon detector which indicating the photons arrived at Bob. 




1310nm in IDQ Clavis systems. In Bob, single photon detector 
is operating in free running mode. To reduce the afterpulse, 
reduced deadtime is applied on the detectors. 
In addition to the quantum channel, a service channel, 
which consists of an optical fiber pair connected back-to-back 
between Alice and Bob units with SFP transceivers. The 
service channel, which is shown in Fig. 4 as dark yellow lines, 
is originally designed by IDQ to provide both the clock signal 
and reconciliation function between an Alice and Bob pair. 
Although the clock signal currently cannot be separated out or 
regenerated without modifying units in use, private 
communications with IDQ have indicated that it would be 
possible to split the two functions of clock transmission and 
the reconciliation channel into two separate channels [32]. The 
separated clock is then distributed to all recipients, as shown 
in our proposed network structure, avoiding any loss or jitter 
of the clock during the switching function. 
 Classical data transmission at a wavelength of 1556nm is 
also added in order to test the feasibility of the QKD signal 
co-existing with classical communication. The classical data 
transmitter (Tx) uses a continuous wave (CW) laser operating 
at a wavelength of 1556nm and modulated by a Mach-Zehnder 
modulator (MZM) driven by a 231-1 PRBS 10Gb/s signal. An 
Erbium-doped Fibre Amplifier (EDFA) with a 0.4nm filter is 
used to amplify the signal. The output of the optical switch, 
controlled remotely by a routing signal generated from a PC 
(PC-Alice), is then launched into single mode fiber after 
optical-electrical conversion by a media converter (ethernet 
switch with SFP ports) at a wavelength of 1531nm. The 
quantum, classical and routing signals are multiplexed using 
WDM couplers and travel to Node A. Different transmission 
lengths are mimicked by adding different optical attenuations. 
We consider 4 paths with losses of 11.6 dB, 11.1 dB, 10.5 dB, 
and 15.6dB. When signals arrive at Bob, the classical data is 
demultiplexed and the bit error rate is measured. The routing 
signal is split out and read by the PC (PC-Bob) via a media 
converter, and a high-speed Digital Input/Output (DIO) Card 
(ADLINK, PCIe-7360) in PC-Bob electronically controls the 
optical switch and routes the quantum signals onto the 
required path. Quantum signals from the desired Node Alice 
pass through the switch and are read by Bob. A 1310nm 
wavelength filter (about 80dB extinction) is used at receiver 
end of the quantum channel to avoid an increase in QBER due 
to the classical channel crosstalk.   
Owing to a limited number of IDQ boxes in the lab, our 
current setup employs only one pair of IDQ Alice and IDQ 
Bob, and the multi-QKD system is virtualized by server-client 
threads using a QKD network software based on C#. 
Physically, two 4x1 switches combine to establish four paths 
to the same Bob. Different losses are then added along each 
path, virtually realizing four Alices at different location. Our 
software enables sending switching commands from PC-Alice 
to PC-Bob periodically or upon request. Initially, PC-Bob 
connects PC-Alice by knowing its IP address, and waiting for 
                  
(a) (b) 
Fig. 6. The QBER measurement (a) and Secure key rate (b) for QKD only  
                  
                                                                                         (a)                                                                                                        (b) 
Fig. 7. The QBER measurement (a) and Secure key rate (b) for QKD+ classical data+ routing signal 




commands. If “Periodic mode” is selected, PC-Bob controls 
the optical switch via the DIO card and changes the path every 
5 minutes without a command from PC-Alice. On the other 
hand, if “Request mode” is chosen, each PC-Alice sends 
remote switch commands to PC-Bob to request a connection. 
PC-Bob then deals with the first request it receives and 
switches the corresponding path for 5 minutes, while placing 
subsequent requests on hold. 
To determine the systems’ operation, firstly the switching 
time is measured, as shown in Fig. 5. The delay between 
sending the electrical routing signal from the DIO card and the 
arrival of photons at the detector indicates the switching time 
is less than 3ms. In the normal operation of the system the 
startup takes an extended time, as the systems determine 
appropriate parameters for the Alice and Bob pair. In our 
experiment with virtual Alices, the key transmission carries on 
without the need to restart the system ab initio each time. In a 
practical implementation with physically-distinct Alice 
elements, it is possible to save these parameters and reload 
them to each Alice and Bob pair as soon as the link is 
switched to connect them [32]. It will then take a greatly 
reduced time to recommence key generation, from where it 
left off last time, rather than the minutes required at the 
moment for an automatic start.  
It is observed that under conditions of moderate channel 
loss (15dB) secure key exchange is achieved by no more than 
20 seconds after completion of the automatic startup and 
configuration routines. This time is clearly dependent on raw 
key rate and QBER which are a function of the channel loss 
and presence of interference. 
Thus, the proposed modification of the system would enable 
the use of multiple physical Alice and Bob elements, while 
still allowing much reduced latency, which is unlikely to be 
greater than 20 seconds, using the current implementations of 
the QKD equipment in use. It should be possible to reduce this 
time by specifically optimizing the protocols for switched 
QKD systems, but this is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Fig. 6 shows the QBER for each path without the classical 
channel. The switch is controlled under the Periodic mode. 
From the Fig. 6(a), we see the change of QBER, which 
indicates the change of path. As a millisecond switching time 
is achieved, secure key measurements are continuously 
updated without any interruption when changing the path. The 
corresponding average secure key rates as a function of 
channel loss and the equivalent transmission distances are 
plotted in Fig. 6(b) with standard deviation error bars for the 
5-minute measurements for each path. The QBER is 
approximately 2.6% for the path with a channel loss of 10.5dB 
(corresponding to 30km of fiber assuming an attenuation 
coefficient of 0.35dB/km at 1310nm), which gives a secure 
key rate of 1.76×103 bits/s. The path with a higher channel 
loss has a higher QBER and consequently a lower secure key 
rate. The QBER of the path with the highest channel loss 
(15.6 dB), equivalent to a transmission distance of 44.6km, is 
increased to around 4.1%, and the secure key rate falls to 
7.36×102 bits/s. The simulated secure key rate, from section 
IV, which is plotted on the same figure, reasonably fits the 
experimental results. The classical data and control signal is 
added to the transmission via a WDM coupler and the 
measurements are then repeated for each path. The launch 
power is fixed to -10dBm, to minimize the leakage from the 
classical channel to the QKD channel. The routing signal is 
also multiplexed in the transmission via a media converter, 
which convert the signal into optical domain. The 
measurements are plotted in Fig. 6. The similarities between 
Figs. 6 and 7 indicate that the additional signals do not affect 
the quantum channel due to the 1310nm filter at Bob which 
has approximately 80dB extinction against the 1550nm band. 
On the other hand, the effective Q factor of the received 
classical data is calculated to be 21.4 dB, both with and 
without QKD transmission, which indicates that the classical 
data transmission is error-free and unaffected by QKD 
transmission.  
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
A method for integrating a low-latency reconfigurable QKD 
system into a realistic metro network is demonstrated in this 
paper. The network structure is designed for both classical and 
quantum transmission in a metropolitan area. Secure keys are 
continuously shared between nodes and end-users using rapid 
optical switching techniques. Efficient encryption solutions 
are presented based on both PTP and ETE topologies. Via a 
series proof-of-concept experiments, the feasibility of the 
proposed network scheme is demonstrated.  
In the experiment, Bob shares keys with four virtual Alices 
at different locations via remotely controlled optical switches. 
Millisecond switching time is observed and raw data 
transmission is reestablished when the quantum channel is 
switched to a different Alice-Bob pair. The QBER and secure 
key rate are investigated for the four different channel 
attenuations corresponding to transmission distances of 30km, 
31.7km, 33.1km and 44.6km. The QBER is found to be 2.6% 
3.2% 3.6% and 4.1% respectively. The measured secure key 
rates are in agreement with theoretical calculation. The 
classical data transmission negligibly affects the quantum 
transmission. As mentioned previously, in our physical setup, 
only one QKD Alice and Bob pair is involved, and the 
multiple Alices are realized by our software and an additional 
optical switch. In future, we would be employ more QKD 
devices at different physical locations. Secondly, the network 
path optimization principle could be used to reduce the 
number of necessary QKD devices (Alices or Bobs) in our 
network structure.  
The use of this clock distribution architecture is predicted to 
enable low latency key reestablishment upon switching 
between different Alice and Bob pairs, with a maximum delay 
of approximately 20 seconds. 
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